Voting Integrity Constraints
Purpose
This document defines non-negotiable constraints for systems that support collective decision-making under the Humanity Framework.
Voting is treated as a safety-critical function. Failure of voting integrity constitutes civilizational harm.
Core Principle
Participation must be:
- equal
- private
- verifiable
- resistant to coercion
- resistant to tampering
- resilient to failure
Trust is insufficient. Correctness must be provable.
Fundamental Guarantees
1. One Human, One Vote
Each eligible human may:
- cast at most one vote per decision
- verify that their vote was counted
- verify that no additional votes were substituted
No system may amplify, suppress, or duplicate participation.
2. Identity Separation
Voting systems must strictly separate:
- eligibility verification
- ballot casting
- vote counting
No component may link:
- voter identity to ballot content
- eligibility credentials to final tally
Linkability after validation is forbidden.
Privacy and Anonymity
3. Ballot Secrecy
No authority may:
- determine how an individual voted
- infer voting behavior through metadata
- reconstruct ballots after casting
Privacy must persist:
- during voting
- after voting
- indefinitely
4. Resistance to Coercion
Systems must prevent:
- proof-of-vote generation
- vote selling
- forced disclosure
If a voter can prove how they voted, the system is unsafe.
Verifiability
5. End-to-End Verifiability
Voting systems must allow:
- voters to verify inclusion of their ballot
- observers to verify correctness of the tally
- auditors to verify process integrity
Verification must not compromise voter anonymity.
6. Public Auditability
Vote counting must be:
- transparent
- reproducible in principle
- independently auditable
Black-box tallying is forbidden.
Integrity and Tamper Resistance
7. Tamper Evidence
All voting artifacts must be:
- immutable once cast
- tamper-evident
- traceable through public logs
Undetectable modification constitutes failure.
8. Determinism and Reproducibility
Vote counting must be:
- deterministic
- reproducible from published artifacts
- independent of hidden state
If two honest auditors cannot reproduce results, the system is invalid.
Infrastructure Constraints
9. Minimal Trusted Computing Base
Voting systems must:
- minimize complexity
- minimize code surface
- minimize dependencies
Complexity increases attack surface. Simplicity increases trust.
10. Network Isolation During Voting
Voting infrastructure must not:
- depend on live network access
- allow remote code execution
- allow dynamic updates during voting
Connectivity increases risk.
Failure Handling
11. Fail-Safe Behavior
On failure, systems must:
- halt voting
- preserve cast ballots
- prevent partial or corrupted tallies
- make failure visible immediately
Silent degradation is forbidden.
Accountability
12. Responsibility for Integrity
Responsibility for voting integrity lies with:
- system designers
- system deployers
- system operators
Voters are never responsible for:
- system compromise
- hidden failure modes
- misleading assurances
Enforcement
Any system that violates these constraints:
- must not be used for governance
- must not be trusted for collective decision-making
- must be withdrawn until corrected
Efficiency does not excuse risk. Convenience does not excuse harm.
Relationship to Other Documents
- Secure Communication Constraints define confidentiality requirements.
- Safety and Responsibility define harm minimization.
- Transparency Guarantees define observability.
- Governance Models define scope and enforcement.
Summary
Democracy cannot rely on trust alone.
A voting system that cannot be verified cannot be legitimate.
Participation without integrity is coercion by other means.